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INTRODUCTION
In searching for an explanation of rising militarization of the 
developing world, we tend to neglect the principal sources of our 
discontent the nation-state system and modernization The success of 
these movements obscures the force and violence accompanying them It is 
unpleasant to recognize that what we hold most dear is costly and 
dangerous Unless we begin with the assumption that what we seek to 
preserve and extend are major obstacles to peace, then one can doubt 
whether the peoples of the world community will be able to fashion a 
workable political system that will at least manage conflicts short of 
mutual destruction if not eliminate completely the play of force in 
deciding our life chances
Part one of this paper elaborates on the close connection between 
militarization, modernization, and the nation-state system Against this 
background, this paper argues that any successful attempt to reduce or 
eliminate the role of force or violence in resolving conflict or to arrest 
the militarization of the global order implies working within the 
nation-state system and with the forces driving the modernization process 
forward The margins of opportunity and maneuver to diminish conflict and 
violence, while narrow, are still discernible and significant Exploiting 
them is worthwhile if modest gains move us away from the brink of nuclear 
holocaust and save lives even as we resign ourselves to intermittent but 
chronic disorder and dislocation The final section of the paper suggests 
some small steps that might be taken to ameliorate the more threatening 
features of our present plight
3Overview of the Argument
The very success of the process of globalizing the nation-state as the 
basic unit of international relations has been the single most important 
factor explaining the militarization of the developing world The Cold War 
has certainly been a catalyst, as each of the superpowers have transferred 
enormous quantities of arms to developing states in their search for 
allies We tend to forget, however, that the superpower competition is 
itself a manifestation of the historic nation-state competition Their 
struggle is evidence of the problem of the system's incipient anarchy, as 
Kenneth Waltz reminds us,1- rather than a viable solution for it In arming 
themselves, they have acted in their own national interests, however 
otherwise those interests have been veiled or even genuinely informed by 
ideological considerations
Were there no superpowers and we had before us merely a collection of 
equally powerful developed nation-states —  after the model of previous 
centuries —  the arms races characterizing the global scene today would 
still very likely be an enormous political problem facing the international 
community The proliferation of military establishments and organized 
centers for the use of force are synonymous with the rise of the modern 
state 2 Its task remains that of settling differences among those pledging 
—  or compelled to pledge —  loyalty to it and of defending its territory 
and population against outside attack j.n the absence of a higher law or 
moral prescription to which states and their leaders can appeal or some 
form of accommodation or compromise among rival nations that can resolve
4Interstate or intrastate conflicts, force or its threat is the great 
arbiter of differences between domestic groups and foreign peoples The 
security dilemma with which we are all familiar was not created by the 
superpower conflict, it simply deepened che problem and divided the world 
community along yet another axis in the wake of the decolonization process, 
accelerated and accented by the antagonism between Moscow and Washington 
but not necessarily the product of that dispute
The triumph of the nation-state, as the provisional answer to the 
security problem confronting all peoples and the world community, is joined 
by the revolutionary force of modernization (including reactionary 
responses like Khomeiny's Iran to it) as the second most powerful 
explanation for the militarization of the world, including the developing 
states Modernization has several characteristics, more or less related, 
although the rate of development and the impact of its several features 
differs from state to state depending on a host of varying local factors 
and conditions Modernization refers (1) to the development of national 
consciousness and unity over tribal, religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
barriers to internal cohesion, (2) to the definition of personal worth and 
social role from ascription as a condition of birth to earned or 
politically assigned status based in varying measure on some notion of 
social and economic utility and of expanded mass participation (or 
mobilization) in political affairs,-^ (3) to the reform of domestic 
socio-economic political institutions, (4) to the preoccupation of 
revolutionary groups and governments with the socio-economic welfare of 
national populations, and (5) to the growth of the size and technical
proficiency of the military establishment viewed both as an instrument and 
as an end of reform
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The modernization process has been synchronous, if not synonymous, 
with the experience of violent conflict and with the steady growth of 
military centers of power around the globe While these characteristics of 
modernization have occurred in many parts of the globe without resort to 
force or its threat, militarization and modernization are not strangers to 
each other, their histories are entwined, and they enjoy intimate company 
in the theories of political change advanced by social scientists and 
political reformers ^
In short, force pays —  or appears to pay It meets the broad 
security needs of peoples, it responds —  or seems to respond —  to the 
driving forces behind modernization's several dimensions In light of this 
real or perceived success story, it is pointless to the partisans of 
militarization to underscore its shortcomings the undermining of the 
security function by overarming^ or the corruption of the modernization 
process by the subversion of popular aspirations for the sake of personal 
aggrandizement (Khaddafi's Libya), by the horrendous costs of transition to 
a brave new world (Pol Pot's Cambodia), by the squandering of resources 
(oil for prestige arms like F-14s for the Shah of Iran and F-15's for Saudi 
Arabia), or by the disruptive and destructive reactionary movements that 
they inspire (Khomeiny's Iran or Pinochet's Chile)
If force seems to pay, then it may also pay us to look more closely at 
its successes and the incentives that are raised in the calculations of 
decision-makers in developing states to continue on the present path toward 
ever greater qualitative and quantitative militarization A greater
6appreciation of these incentives suggests the kinds of remedies needed 
either to reduce the impact on decisions that support militarization (where 
it occurs), to channel militarization toward constructive purposes, like 
regional peacekeeping and the support of non-alignment, and to create zones 
of stability that will encourage arms control and disarmament negotiations 
and accords
The Security Dilemma Viewed as an Opportunity 
The Experience of the Developing States
The decolonization experience so far provides little support and less 
comfort for those who would like to cite history to demonstrate the limited 
utility of force today World Wars I and II, m  devastating the European 
powers, also destroyed the Eurocentric system and, along with it, the 
colonial structure that was an integral component of the Eurocentric world 
The Cold War gave impetus to the decolonization process The superpower 
conflict induced Moscow and Washington, in search of allies everywhere, to 
portray themselves as the friends of national self-determination The 
European colonial powers had to learn this lesson the hard way at Suez 
The Nasser regime survived because it could play upon the pressures exerted 
by the superpowers on the European states In condemning France’s and 
Britain's invasion, the United States exposed the dependency of its allies 
on the American security guarantee The Soviet Union's sabre-rattling 
provided the occasion for the exercise of American power The audience 
before which this fleeting display of superpower unity was enacted was, of 
course, the developing states whose allegiance remains a continuing concern 
of each superpower's global strategy
7Increased military capability appears useful to developing states for 
a variety of purposes related to decolonization to complete the 
decolonization process, to preserve non-alignment m  the Cold War struggle 
that, incidentally, has aided the self-determination movement, and to fend 
off efforts by the developed states, particularly the superpowers, to 
re-establish colonial rule under a different guise The civil strife in 
Namibia is only the latest installment of the long African effort to end 
white colonial rule South Africa remains the final bastion The peaceful 
engagement policy of the Reagan administration may bring about desired 
change Many Africans, however, are not betting solely on that dubious 
prospect Similarly, Palestinians and their supporters —  or those who use 
them for their purposes —  are not easily convinced that Israel will agree 
to a Palestinian homeland, short of the chreat or use of arms The aim of 
a Palestinian state assumes m  many Arabs minds, whatever the substantive 
truth of the perception, a struggle against western imperialism
American-Soviet interventions around the globe are also a source of 
concern The American record in Latin America is long and durable 
Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Santo Domingo (1965), Chile (1973), Grenada 
(1983), and, on a longer-term basis, El Salvador and Nicaragua In Asia, 
memories of Vietnam have not waned In Africa, there is Angola and 
intermittent support for the South African regime as well as Zaire 
Lebanon in 1958 and 1984 bracket continued American efforts to influence 
and shape internal Middle East politics With the growth of Soviet 
military capabilities —  increased airlift and a blue water navy —  the 
ability to intervene has been matched by a heightened willingness to 
exercise Soviet power Afghanistan is the most blatant example, but
8sizeable Soviet military detachments are garrisoned in Cuba and Syria with 
additional missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia
These decolonization and counter-colonization efforts tell only a part 
of the story of the militarization of the developing states By their own 
measure, success m  arms reinforces the need for strong, modern military 
establishments From several perspectives, more and better arms and 
militarization make sense The military prowess of the developing states, 
has determined outcomes of interstate conflicts and has been a decisive 
factor in deciding the victorious parties in intrastate strife These 
successes, in turn, highlight the strategic assets at the disposal of the 
developing states and their utility as bargaining levers and chips in 
extracting concessions from other states, particularly the superpowers ^
The incentives for militarization are also rooted in regional 
conflicts Winners and losers are not dissuaded by the costs and risks of 
military preparedness India and Israel owe their regional dominance to 
victories on the battlefield Their adversaries, however, have not 
relented, but have re-doubled their efforts to regain their lost status 
Iraq’s Hussein might well regret his country’s attack on Iran after four 
years of costly war, but at the start of the conflict, most analysts 
favored Iraq’s chances of imposing its demands on the Khomeiny regime 
Similarly, Argentina’s ruling junta felt it could impose its demands on 
Britain by a show of force That it lost and was toppled from power does 
not negate the point that the incentives for using or threatening force are 
great despite the many setbacks experienced by specific nations State 
leaders assume that losses in war happen to someone else, they act much
9like many of us when we consider our cha ices about being involved in an 
automobile accident
The chances taken by Iraq and Argentina were prompted by the 
calculation made by all strategists the likelihood of gaining advantages 
by force appears to outweigh immediate costs or risks Little else except 
some form of balancing counterforce appears effective to dissuade resort to 
violence, although mounting such an effort can easily generate into a 
destabilizing arms race As Andre Beaufre has shown,^ these sobering 
considerations are recognized more in the breach than in the observance 
since expected losses appear tolerable while gains seem certain and clear 
at hand War has not lost its luster among many developing states nor do 
many look upon it as reprehensible as is the case among many developed 
states Furthermore nuclear weapons, as Yehezkel Dror argues,® are also 
approached with less disdain among Third World nations Important barriers 
to proliferation are increasingly in danger of being transgressed We now 
have a Christian, Communist, Hindu and Jewish bomb Can an Islamic bomb be 
far behind7
The number of successful military interventions launched by developing 
states to control the political fate of other states and their governments 
gives a fillip to militarization that is hard to argue away Cuba's 
intervention in Ethiopia and Angola turned the tide in favor of 
Communist-backed governments Morocco restored Zaire's control of Shaba 
province The northern half of Chad has fallen under Libyan influence 
Algeria skillfully checks Morocco's pretentions to the western Sahara by 
providing arms and sanctuary to the Polisario
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Table 1 outlines the military interventions initiated by African 
states against neighbors to establish order, to counter or to support 
insurgencies, and, generally, to influence or control the political 
processes and governmental decisions within other states The use of Cuban 
troops to bolster sagging Ethiopian forces against Somalia and Eritrean 
rebels and to ensure the victory of the Neto regime in Angola illustrate 
spectacularly how developing states are mastering the soldiering skills of 
the developed states and are spearheading fundamental restructuring of the 
domestic political orders of third states Of the 33 interventions noted 
in Table 1 over the past twenty years in Africa, approximately two-thirds 
can be categorized as successes
Other regions record similar favorable outcomes for the intervening 
state, whatever one may think of the threat to regional or global peace 
that the use of military force may entail India*s intervention in the 
Pakistan civil war led, simultaneously, to the creation of Bangladesh and 
to undisputed Indian dominance over South Asia Syria's stock is now high 
as its clients in Lebanon score heavily against the Lebanese army and the 
United States Vietnam's hold on Southeast Asia remains firm despite 
Chinese and ASEAN efforts to contain Hanoi in Cambodia and Laos
As winners in these age-old nation-state security games, developing 
states possessing effective military forces inevitably become attractive 
partners for other nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet 
Union Former American Secretary of State Alexander Haig referred often to 
Argentina and South Africa as valuable strategic assets to anchor his 
ill-considered conception of what should be the West's strategy in the 
southern hemisphere Off-and-on, Washington has considered Israel an
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TABLE 1
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS BY DEVELOPING 
STATES IN AFRICA 
1964-present*
Target
State
Intervening
State Time Span
Forces
Involved Outcome
Zanzibar Tanganyika 1/17/64-
4/6/64
100-200 Internal 
police Security
(IS)
Success
Tanganyika U K and 
Nigeria
U K 1/25/64- 
4/26/64 Nigeria 
3/28/64-mid- 
summer 1964
600 British 
600 Nigerian
IS
Congo(Leo­
poldville, 
Kinshasa)
Ethiopia 
Ghana,
Belgium, U S
7/12/67-12/67 various
elements
IS Success
Nigeria Egypt 8/68-8/69(?) Small number 
of combat 
troops and 
ground crews
IS Success
Sudan Egypt 3/27-30/70 Egyptian
pilots
Counter
Insurgency
(Cl)
Success
Sierra
Leone
Guinea 3/28/71- 
early 72(7)
200 troops, 
plus
helicopters
IS Success
Burundi Zaire 4/30/72-
mid-72(7)
100 troops, & 
jet fighters
Cl Success
Uganda Libya 9/20/72-1974 approx 400 mili­
tary technicians 
(Palestinians, 
plus transport 
aircraft)
Cl No clear 
outcome
Angola South
Africa
8/75-3/26/76 4000-5000 troops 
with armor & 
air transport
Support
Insurgency
Failure
Angola Zaire
(see above)
9/75-1/76 Two commando 
battalions plus 
armor and 
artillery
Support
Insurgency
Failure
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Target
State
Intervening
State Time Span
Forces
Involved
Type
of
Operation Outcome
Angola Cuba 7/75-present up to 20,000 
Cubans with 
armor, artil­
lery and air 
support
Cl Success
Mauritania Morocco 12/20/75-
9/9/79
9000 troops 
with armor & 
air support
Cl Failure
Mozambique Tanzania 1976-1979 200-1000 
combat troops
External
Defense
Success
Zaire France/ 
Morocco 
(U S )
4/7/77- 
May, 1977
France 65 ad­
visors & air 
transport 
Morocco 1500 
infantry
Cl Success
Zaire France May, 1978 French para­
troopers
Humanitar­
ian
Success
Ethiopia Somalia 7/77-3/15/78 17000-40000 
troops, with 
armor & air 
support
Support
Insurgency
Failure
Ethiopia USSR, East 
Germany,
S Yemen, 
Cuba
1/78-present Russia 1500 mil- Cl 
itary, E Germany 
1000, S Yemen 
3000, Cuba 22000 
with armor, air 
support
Success 
in Ogaden 
mixed re­
sults in 
Eritrea
Equatorial
Guinea
Cuba 1978-80 500 IS Failure
Sao Tome & 
Principe
Angola/Cuba 2/78-1981 1500 Angolan 
troops with 
Cuban advisors
IS Success
Chad Libya 4/78-6/80 3-4000, with 
armor and air 
support
Support
Insurgency
Success
Uganda Tanzania 1/79-4/24/79 30000-40000 
troops, with 
armor/air 
support
Support
Insurgency
Success
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Target
State
Intervening
State Time Span
Forces
Involved
Type
of
Operation Outcome
Uganda Tanzania/
Mozambique
3/25/79-
present
Initially 3000- 
4000 troops, by 
1979, 1500
Cl Success
Uganda Libya 3/79-4/24/79 approx 2500 
with
Palestinians
External
Defense
Failure
Chad Nigeria 4/7/79-
6/3/79
1600 armed 
infantry
Peace­
keeping
Failure
Equatorial
Guinea
Morocco 9/24/79-
present
200 military IS Success
Chad Zaire/OAU 1/27/80- 
May, 80
500 troops 
from Zaire
Peace­
keeping
Failure
Chad Libya 6/1980-
11/3/81
8000-9000 
troops, with 
armor and air 
support
Cl Success
Gambia Senegal 10/28/80-
11/9/80
400 IS Success
Gambia Senegal 8/2/81- 
present(7)
2700-5000 IS Success
Chad Zaire, 
Nigeria, 
Senegal, OAU
11/15/81-
6/82
Zaire 600 
Nigeria 2000 
Senegal 600
Peace­
keeping
Failure
Somalia Ethiopia Fall, 1981- 
present
unknown Support
Insurgency
Uncertain
Chad Libya Spring, 1983 
-present
3000-6000 Support
Insurgency
Uncertain
Chad France/
Zaire
August, 1983 
-present
3000-France
2000-Zaire
Cl Uncertain
♦Source University of Illinois Research Team, Factors Affecting the Role and 
Employment of Peacekeeping Forces in Africa South of the Sahara, Contract 
No MDA 908-82-C-0174 (December, 1982) and authors update
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extension of American military power in the Middle East Only recently the 
Reagan administration gave form to this thinking in military accords signed 
between the Israeli and American governments No less does the Soviet 
Union see Cuban, Vietnamese, and Syrian military forces as instruments of 
its efforts to increase its influence around the globe
The strategic assets at the disposal of developing states are, of 
course, greater than simply the increasingly large and sophisticated forces 
that they have created Bases, for use in a wide variety of third state 
security activities, also make developing states attractive Robert 
Harkavy's Great Powers Competition for Overseas Bases traces the growth of 
superpower basing systems to support their armed forces and to cover a wide 
range of activities repair facilities, storage of ammunition and 
supplies, anchorage and overflights, refueling, crew R and R, staging, flag 
showing, communication links, navigation reconnaissance and intelligence, 
satellite tracking, and garrisoning of troops 9 Developing states have 
also been helpful in re-transferring arms (e g  Libyan Mirages to Egypt) in 
financing arms acquisitions (e g Saudi support for Morocco's war against 
the Polisario), in gathering intelligence (Israel on the Arab states), in 
proposing peace initiatives (Morocco and Saudi efforts on behalf of the 
PLO), and in support of terrorism and counter-terrorism (PLO, Libyan 
Israeli, and Northern Irish activities)
Modernization, Militarization, and the 
Domestication of International Relations
Except for the Bangladesh episode, the nation-state as a unit of 
political organization has held up remarkably well It has survived
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decolonization and the Cold War The bipolarity of the superpower conflict 
has been fundamentally shaped and inflected by the rise of new centers of 
power in the developing world The interests and demands of these states 
cannot be ignored, as suggested above, since they are able to affect 
outcomes between states at war and between rival factions vying to 
control the government of a state Developing states must now be counted 
among the significant international actors determining —  to use Arnold 
Wolfers' characterization —  possession and milieu goals 10 The latter 
have become increasingly important and represent the principal aim of 
military force today, whether used directly or as a bargaining lever The 
distinction between high and low politics, so precious to power politics 
analysts, has lost much of its theoretical and practical force as 
international relations have become increasingly domesticated 
Closely associated with this domestication process, but 
distinguishable from it, is the use or threat of organized violence to 
speed and ensure the modernization process in its various forms It is 
perhaps conceptually and analytically possible to separate the processes of 
militarization and modernization, but they are, however, more closely 
entwined and symbiotically reinforcing t lan the well intentioned proponents 
of arms control and disarmament would like us to believe Nor can they be 
simply associated with a particular socio-economic order, like capitalism, 
as some authors would have us conclude H  What explains Syrian President 
Assad's systematic extermination of dissidents within his regime or Idi 
Amin's terrorism against his own people7
For purposes of analysis five different features of the modernization 
process have been identified Militarization can be associated with each
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one First, in many states the army is not only the state but the 
principal vehicle for nation-building and the glue that holds together a 
society otherwise at odds with itself The large number of military 
regimes on the Right and Left around the world suggest the critical role 
that the military play in maintaining national cohesion Like Prussia 
before, many nations may be characterized as states in search of a national 
identity The Central African Republic, Zaire, and Sudan fit this image 
Controlling fissiparous and centrifugal forces within national societies is 
among the key roles played by military forces, as in Indonesia, Thailand, 
Egypt and Guatemala
This nation-building and system-maintenance role, while a necessary 
condition of modernization, is not sufficient for its full expression 
Military regimes, like Samoza’s Nicaragua and Marcos' Philippines, are used 
by conservative elements as barriers to the emergence of domestic 
socio-economic and political institutions that elicit increased popular 
participation in national politics and that private social development of 
the poor and disadvantaged and a redistnbutionof wealth It has been 
almost inevitable that the reliance on military force to show modernization 
has compelled a corresponding resort to violence to overthrow these anciens 
regimes Once a new order, as in Cuba and in Nicaragua, is installed newly 
acquired coercive habits are hard to break These modernization trends 
are by no means liberal or democratic when viewed from a western 
perspective Modernizing regimes are often no less oppressive than their 
authoritarian predecessors —  even worse as the Pol Pot regime reveals 
They are, however, animated by a pervasive reformist urge that is largely 
opposed to traditional ways and feudal arrangements and to privileges for
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the few The slow, painful, disruptive transformation of the western world 
from Gemeinschaft to Gesselschaft has now spread to the rest of the globe,
bringing with it new and powerful incentives to arm, whether to create a
revolution, preserve it, or to export it to other states to ensure the 
survival of these socio-political transformations Militarism and 
modernism, like Siamese twins sharing a common circulatory system, are 
viewed as so mutually dependent that mos*. leaders of the developing world, 
can hardly conceive them as ever being separated
More, of course, is at play than simply the destruction of feudal
institutions and special privilege to open the way for lasting reform 
Even democratic states, like India, have adopted strategies and 
rationalized government expenditures that tie inextricably the nation’s 
security and welfare functions Since the problems of security, broadly 
conceived, have put pressures on developing states to increase their 
defense expenditures, they have tried to decrease the cost of arms 
purchases abroad to save their reserves and to maximize their independence 
As a result, they have gradually developed their own arms industries
Not only are developing states able to produce more weapons than ever 
before but they are also able to design and fabricate a larger variety of 
sophisticated weapons systems Table 2 lists the growing number of states 
in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East which produce weapon 
systems in four major categories —  aircraft, armored vehicles, tactical 
missiles, and naval vessels and the number of systems that states within 
each category are producing The level of production independence achieved 
by a state with respect to a particular weapon system varies The range, 
as defined by Andrew Ross, covers licensed assembly at the lowest point of
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Table 2
AIRCRAFT
ARMS PRODUCTION 
1960,
1960
IN DEVELOPING 
1970, 1980
1970
COUNTRIES
1980
# of # of // of # of # of # of
countries systems countries systems countries systems
Fighters 1 2 3 4 6 10
Trainers (jet) 3 3 4 4 3 5
Trainers (basic) 
Maritime (recon-
6 7 5 6 11 13
naissance) - - - - 2 2
Transports 1 1 4 6 8 11
Aircraft (engines) 1 1 2 2 6 8
Helicopters 1 1 2 2 11 15
Avionics - - - - 3 3
Total 7 15 8 24 18 67
GROUND EQUIPMENT
Tanks - - 3 3 5 6
APC - - 1 2 5 6
Armored Cars 
Reconnaissance
2 2 2 2
Vehicles - - - - 2 2
Armored Bridgelayers - - - - 1 1
Total — — 5 7 6 17
MISSILES
Surface-to-air - - - - 5 6
Air-to-ground - - 1 1 3 3
Air-to-air 1 1 2 2 5 5
Surface-to-surface 1 1 1 1 3 4
Anti-tank - - 1 1 7 8
Total 1 2 5 5 9 26
NAVAL VESSELS
Frigates 1 1 1 1 4 5
Corvettes 2 2 2 2 1 1
Patrol Craft 8 8 13 13 20 25
Submarines - - - - 3 3
Amphibious Craft 1 1 2 2 4 4
Support Craft 6 6 4 4 7 7 X
Total 13 18 15 22 25 45
Sources Andrew L Ross, Arms Production in Developing Countries The Continuing
Proliferation of Conventional Weapons, No N-1615-AF, Rand Corporation 
Note, Santa Monica, California, 1981, pp 16-19 and Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook, 1974, 
pp 230-258, and ibid, 1980, pp 168-173 (Cambridge Oelgeschlager, Gunn
and Hain, Inc ) The People’s Republic of China is excluded
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capability to licensed component production, licensed system production, 
system modification and reverse engineering, dependent R & D and 
production, and independent R & D and production at succeedingly higher 
levels on the scale 12 in short, the number of states producing weapons of 
any kind, the number of different weapons produced by these states, and the 
levels of production independence reached by these states are increasing 
In each of the weapons categories that are listed in Table 2, the 
number of states producing a particular item has grown, in several cases 
they have more than doubled in the decade between 1970 and 1980 Several 
areas bear particular notice Between 1970 and 1980, the number of states 
producing fighters grew from three to six, basic trainers from five to 
eleven, and helicopters from two to eleven Over-all, the number of states 
in the developing world producing aircraft at some level of independence 
doubled from eight to eighteen 13 Similarly, naval craft producers climbed 
from fifteen to twenty five with a significant increase in the number of 
states capable of producing patrol and support craft 1^
Production of armored vehicles and tactical missiles has grown more 
slowly Over the decade since 1970, the number of states producing tanks 
increased from three to five and armored personnel carriers (APCs) from one 
to five The total number of ground armor producing states rose from five 
to six 13 ihe producers of tactical missiles tripled in the same period 
from five to nine 13 Producers of SAM missiles leaped from zero to 
five,17 those producing anti-tank weapons, from one to seven 13 Five 
states (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and South Africa) produce arms at 
some level of independent capability in all four major categories
20
These figures also imply a high stage of technological development 
since aircraft, missiles, electronics, and aircraft engines require a broad 
scientific, engineering, and industrial base However much countries like 
China or India may still be considered underdeveloped, measured by GNP and 
per capita income, they have been able to accumulate the technological 
systems to produce advanced military equipment One can metaphorically 
speak of a Belgium emerging from India or a Netherlands arising from an 
otherwise underdeveloped South Korea The same process of modernization, 
with military technology as the spearhead, may be seen to be operating in 
other states, like Brazil, Pakistan, and Argentina ^  Modernization is 
seen to be partially a function of a technologically advanced warfighting 
and economic system, linked to a capacity to sell arms and military 
know-how abroad
The interest in advanced military technology is associated logically 
with still another indicator of the growing military capability of 
developing states the proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons 
India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 shattered any remaining 
illusions that nuclear proliferation might be arrested in the developing 
world 20 -jhe Chinese nuclear explosion, based on a sophisticated 
enrichment process, should have ended such hopes, a decade earlier 
Pakistan, according to public reports, is rapidly approaching the explosion 
of the first Islamic bomb 21 other candidates for nuclear status include 
Iraq, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina Many 
analysts assume that Israel has acquired the necessary technology and has 
assembled, short of testing, several nuclear bombs 22
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Developing states are already exporting their surplus arms production 
capacity abroad Among developing states, Israel, Brazil, and, to a lesser 
extent, South Korea have enjoyed some success as arms suppliers Israel 
has reached world stature as a supplier of quality products, some 
indigenously produced, like the Gabriel surface-to-surface missile, or 
adapted the technology of its suppliers, like the Kfir fighter, patterned 
after the French Mirage airframe and powered by US-built GE engines
Israel sells military arms and equipment to a wide range of customers, 
including West Germany, Indonesia, South Africa, Singapore, Taiwan, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and, until recently, Nicaragua It 
has reportedly sold war materiel to Iran although diplomatic relations 
between the two states have been severed Its Daggar aircraft, capable of 
being armed with air-to-ground missiles, is currently being employed by 
Argentine air forces It also produces civil aircraft, all forms of 
tactical missiles (listed in Table 2), patrol boats, armored vehicles, 
artillery and small arms, radar systems, communication and navigation 
systems, industrial and shipborne monitoring and control systems, medical 
electronics, microelectronics, computers and computerized communications 
systems, fire control systems, security systems, air and ground crew 
equipment, ground-support equipment, and microwave components 23 aCDA 
lists exports of $260 million for 1981 and $360 million for 1982, figures 
that are likely to be conservative 24
Brazil has also captured markets in the Middle East and Africa and 
must be considered an important arms supplier It has sold equipment, 
especially light armored vehicles, to Togo, Libya, Qatar, and Iraq The 
Cascavel, a light armored vehicle that mounts a 90 mm cannon and carries
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laser range-finders, has seen service with Iraqi armed forces in the war 
with Iran and with Libyan forces in Chad Brazil's state-owned Empresa 
Brasileira de Aeronautica (Embraer) is the world's sixth largest aviation 
firm It sells the twin-engine Bandeira ite aircraft worldwide and also 
manufactures the Xavante jet under Italian license Brazilian arms are 
also attractive to developed states The United States Marines closely 
studied a Brazilian light tank for possible purchase, and France has 
already purchased Brazilian light transport aircraft for its armed forces 
Brazil is likely to continue to invest in its arms industry in the future 
As one close student of Brazilian politics and foreign and security policy 
observes
Brazilian arms are especially attractive to 
third-world countries since they are comparatively 
simple, high quality, and free of ideological ties 
Because of the growing demand for Brazilian arms, and 
given that Brazil must increase exports to compensate for 
rising petroleum prices, the state continues to assign a 
high priority to investment in what already is the 
largest and most sophisticated conventional-weapons 
industry m  South America As a major arms supplier, 
Brazil will be able to exert greater pressure on its 
neighbors and to increase its influence in the emerging 
commercial markets of black Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia 25
There is much force in the argument that spending resources on arms 
reduces what can be devoted to human welfare, and there is considerable 
documentation comparing expenditures for both objectives 26 However, this 
relationship is far from being a zero-sum game as perceived by national 
decision-makers concerned with security and welfare problems 27 As this 
paper has suggested, there are powerful economic and technological 
incentives that prompt decision-makers in developing states to invest in
23
arms production At least in the short and middle term, marginal gains 
appear to be forthcoming, justifying the original investment It does 
little good to argue with the leadership of these national production 
centers that they are wasting national resources, much less does the 
argument cut that global resources are being squandered with the result 
that regional and world tensions are likely to rise These considerations 
apparently have lesser weight when one examines the specific decision taken 
by decision-makers at the national level where resource allocation goes on 
Announced commmitments to arms control goals or to a decrease in arms 
traffic are repeatedly subordinated by arms producing states to the 
continued expansion of military production and transfers Neutralist 
governments in India and Brazil, while critical of superpower arms 
policies, are committed to the expansion and improvement of their arms 
producing and marketing capabilities India integrates economic and 
military planning, going further than some non-western states The 
Brazilian leadership is no less bent on a policy of military and economic 
independence, however doubtful or illusory that goal may appear
Some analysts in the developing world are prepared to argue that 
economic development can actually be spurred either as a spin-off of 
military preparedness or, further, as a direct result of military 
expenditures The welfare-defense debate may be characterized in these 
terms If the predominant opinion within India still views defense 
spending as an economic burden, influential segments of the security 
community promote military expenditures and arms production as complements
of civilian economic development or as a motor-force of the civilian 
29economy ^
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From a political and psychological perspective, the economic claims of 
these schools of thought are not especially relevant What counts more, 
often more than real economic benefits, in determining resource allocations 
favoring arms production is the perception of economic and technological 
gain Further research will be needed to determine the validity of the 
economic claims of supporters of increased defense spending and arms 
production as well as the political influence of these advocates at the 
national level in allocating scarse resourse for arms and welfare If the 
upward increase in global military spending, especially on the part of 
developing states is any guide, and if reference to specific case studies 
of the behavior of national leaders in Israel, Brazil, and India are any 
indication, the argument that one must sacrifice welfare for military 
prowess and vice versa is by no means universally accepted Many go beyond 
the guns-butter tradeoff and argue that a nation gets more butter because 
of guns
Some of the incentives for militarization, outlined above, are 
reflected in Tables 3-6 in the expansion among developing states of 
military expenditures, personnel, and capabilities They show upward 
trends, respectively, in absolute military expenditures, per capita 
expenditures, arms imports, and the size of armed forces They suggest not 
only a response to security and modernization but a process by which 
militarization fuels itself Military and militarized regimes tend to 
favor their own needs and interests even at the expense of decreased 
welfare expenditures In many quarters within the developing world, the 
modern military establishment is regarded as a measure of modernization 
Since scientific and technological progress furnishes ever new levels of
(TABLE 6
ARMS IMPORTS OF THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD, 1970-1979 
( in  b i l l i o n  constant 1978 d o l la r s )
Source ACDA, World M il it a r y  Expenditures and Arms T ra n s fe rs  1970-1979, p 7
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efficient and effective lethality, the military modernization process 
becomes open-ended Created is a vicious cycle security and 
modernization imperatives that drive the reform of domestic socio-economic 
institutions, the re-distributions and equalization of natural wealth, 
greater industrialization, and increased technological development provide 
the occasion for enhanced militarization which, once commenced, becomes 
self-perpetuating
NEUTRALIZING AND NEGATING THE INCENTIVES OF MILITARIZATION
Taming the Superpowers and Disengaging from the Cold War
The incentives favoring militarization today would appear to outweigh 
the costs and risks run in pursuing such a policy The upward curve of the 
indicators displayed in Tables 3-6 are a source of concern If the 
analysis above is correct, militarization, measured as some form of 
quantitative and qualitative increase in arms capability in the developing 
world, is deeply embedded in the nation-state system and in the 
modernization process sweeping through the system One is led to the 
unsettling conclusion that both would have to be dismantled or transformed 
before the play of force or the threat of violence in resolving conflicts 
were eliminated We would face the paradoxical situation that overwhelming 
force would have to be marshalled to bring about a reversal of deep, 
unrelenting historical trends of passionate concern to literally billions 
of people
It may be argued that the superpowers have, indeed, attempted to do 
precisely that to bend the globalization of the nation-state and 
modernization process to their advantage While representing themselves as
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the friends of national self-determination and the partisans of reform, the 
superpower conflict can be viewed as an attempt by Moscow and Washington to 
capture and enlist these forces for their needs and interests They have 
invested enormous military resources either in the direct use of force or 
in the form of military aid and arms to promote their national and 
ideological objectives in the developing world Many believe in both camps 
that the East-West balance hangs on the outcome of the North-South 
conflict Witness Soviet support of wars of liberation and American 
efforts in Vietnam and El Salvador to prevent foreign intervention, to 
forestall domestic takeover by hostile elements, and to reform domestic 
institutions in order to neutralize the source of revolutionary warfare, 
viz , the disadvantaged who are mobilized to oppose the government
In the name of collective security (Truman and Brezhnev doctrines), 
both superpowers ostensibly defend nation-states against foreign invasion 
and seek to preserve and extend either liberal-democratic or socialist 
economic and political institutions around the world Neither has the 
capability to impose its will on the global political system nor to ensure 
that its preferences become law in guiding the political and institutional 
development of the developing world The superpowers are blocked partly as 
a consequence of the will and capacity of the developing state to resist 
superpower pressures or to manipulate the conflict at the expense of one or 
the other of them —  or both If the postwar experience is any guide and 
if the current phase of the superpower conflict is any indication, both 
will undoubtedly continue to try to widen their influence The prospects 
for superpower accommodation in the developing world in the foreseeable 
future do not appear high
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Lacking a federator to impose order on the international system and 
confronting the likelihood of more and increasingly lethal and destructive 
upheaval in attempts by the superpowers to try to play a federator role, 
what can the developing states do to lower the possibilities and prospects 
of global and regional conflict within the existing nation-state structure 
and under the pressures of continued social, economic and political change7 
In other words, how can the current forces dominating the global scene be 
used or tempered to decrease the costs and risks of militarization and how 
can they be directed toward peacekeeping and regional stability7
Two general principles would appear useful to guide and control the 
militarization process (1) insulate the superpower conflict as much as 
possible from conflicts in the developing world and (2) de-militarize the 
modernization process Both principles, while easy to state, are extremely 
difficult to apply The following points are designed to be modest steps 
toward them
The non-alignment movement, currently polarized and moribund, needs to 
be revived as a response to the heightened tensions between the 
superpowers That will be hard The visionary and strong leadership of 
the original non-aligned movement has not been replaced by a cadre of 
similar stature and imagination States, like Cuba and Egypt, have 
tarnished their credentials in aligning, respectively, with the Soviet 
Union and the United States Internal splits within the movement have also 
weakened the force of these states in international negotiations
The incentives for non-alignment still exist What is partly lacking 
is an institutional vehicle to give stability and direction to the 
grouping Formed, say, within the U N , like the Group of 77, the
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non-aligned movement would have a dual task to press the superpower to 
agree to arms control and disarmament accords at the nuclear and 
conventional levels and to oversee superpower security activities in the 
principal regions of the world This might include annual reports of 
military actions (e g the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the U S  in El 
Salvador), movements of troops, base agreements and use of foreign 
facilities, military advisory missions, and arms and military technology 
transfers
These monitoring tasks of the developing states would aim at exposing 
the threats to regional and global peace posed by American and Soviet 
military policies and behavior There currently exists no independent 
agency within the U N that tracks superpower moves The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies and Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute attempt part of this job, but neither focuses specifically on 
plotting superpower behavior and influence in the developing world A 
monitoring agency attached to a non-aligned grouping would presumably have 
the resources and interest to shed light on superpower moves that might 
undermine the non-aligned movement In this regard, the French proposal to 
invest the U N with its own intelligence satellites makes sense It would 
provide an independent means for verifying the superpower strategic 
balance It would be an international instrument available to monitor 
superpower accords under START and perhaps under a revived superpower 
conventional arms transfer talks (CAT)
Developing states should also continue to diversify their sources of 
supply for arms and military technology and, where feasible, undertake 
their own production If militarization cannot be excised from the
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nation-state system and modernization process, its more harmful effects can 
perhaps be softened and contained Reducing dependency on the superpowers 
is a useful first step Where arms purchases threaten a state's economic 
reserves and balance of payments situation, it may make sense to encourage 
domestic production as the best, if imperfect, means available today to 
respond to often contradictory security and modernization imperatives
Second, regional security organizations should be fostered They are 
useful insulators against superpower depredations They can be expected to 
play a moderating role in reducing regional conflict and even a 
peacekeeping function at some time in the future All this will take time, 
but the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Contadora group within 
the Organization of American States (OAS), and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations suggest that such groupings can be useful buffers between the 
superpowers and act as peacemakers within their regions or as checks 
against local hegemonists These organizations also have an interest in 
monitoring arms and military technology flows within their spheres of 
interest It would appear useful to lodge these monitoring services within 
the same agency formed by the non-aligned movement within the U N  An 
international staff of experts, with access to global intelligence services 
of the military attache system and strategic research centers around the 
globe, could publish annual reviews on militarization, measured by 
expenditures made on arms, the kind and number of materials produced or 
purchased abroad, and the transfers and aid made to a nation by the 
superpowers or third states creating new and more sensitive instruments 
than we now have to measure militarization would also be among its major
responsibilities
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Armed with these data, and data impact statements, similar to arms 
control evaluations required by U S statute to accompany new weapons 
proposals, might be published The military council envisioned by the U N 
Charter might well be reorganized and given new life as an arms control 
watchdog rather than to plan, as originally envisioned, operations on 
behalf of collective security roles that are beyond the U N 's capacity to 
pursue An international military staff of experts could be used to sound 
the alarm of emerging disequilibrium whether as a result of superpower 
activities or of local powers bent on gaining ascendancy at the expense of 
their neighbors
Third, where clear ascendancy has been achieved, it should be 
recognized as a fact of international life and recorded by the United 
Nations as a fait accompli Such realism is m  keeping with the intent of 
the founders of the U N Charter that assigned special security 
responsibilities and authority to the Security Council and its five 
permanent members States like India in South Asia, Nigeria in Black 
Africa, and Brazil in Latin America play, because of their size and 
resources as well as their real or emerging military prowess, critical 
regional security roles Their importance should be acknowledged by the 
world community and their regional positions formalized to provide an 
incipient political structure to a region Although local adversaries will 
certainly resist extending such status, it make little sense to ignore the 
military weight of selected developing states and their special 
responsibility for regional and global security Some states are more equal 
than others, however otherwise they mighu be legally and morally 
equivalent
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In this respect, a country like Japan, while not a developing state, 
should also enjoy permanent Security Council membership Its elevation 
would emphasize its special role in the international economic system and 
the link between that system and peace in the developing world Japan's 
participation would symbolize the need to address the non-military 
determinants of security on a systematic basis and to enlist the developed 
and developing states in this enterprise
In this connection, the European Community might also be given a 
permanent seat As a civil body it would have a special role for pressing 
the need for progress in augmenting southern-tier welfare as a bar to civil 
strife, regional conflict, and superpower intervention In this way the 
positive aspects of modernization would be emphasized and efforts designed 
to promote them would be addressed in the Security Council in a 
non-threatening manner Although the current permanent members of the 
Security Council resist tying narrowly conceived security issues to human 
welfare, there is ample reason for the developing states to press this 
point while there is still time to deal with security and modernization 
questions on a broad front
As Table 7 suggests, military expenditures in constant 1978 dollars 
has been surprisingly level in Africa, Latin American, and South Asia in 
the 1970s To keep them flat and to lower the level of spending in the 
Middle East and East Asia, the security and welfare of the peoples living 
in these regions will have to be addressed as different aspects of what in 
the final analysis appears to be a single problem
The problem of peace is so complex that it seems reasonable to seek it 
in regional parts and to fashion security and modernization strategies
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appropriate to each region If war cannot be eliminated from a particular 
region, then perhaps its infection to other regions and to the rest of the 
globe can be quarantined That is a more modest goal than one seeking 
global harmony and prosperity By that token it is more likely to be 
within our reach We have to take the world as it is, as a world of parts, 
and attempt to keep as many of these pieces as intact as possible in making 
them the elements of an evolving mosaic, often maddeningly within pattern 
but nevertheless informed by a sense of what works Such a peace will 
undoubtedly be shaky and unsettling but very likely safer than that which 
we have currently fashioned
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